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Abstract
The current application of the doctrine of eminent domain is representative of a steady degradation of individual
property rights. Although the 5th Amendment, which protects the eminent domain clause, states that property can only
be appropriated for a "public use," the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that eminent domain can be applied if the
disputed land will be used for some "public purpose". The linguistic distinction between public "purpose" and public
"use" is crucial in the interpretation of the doctrine of eminent domain because the term "purpose" is much vaguer than
"use" and consequently leads to a greater abuse of the doctrine. Through examining the original intent of legislative
authors and reflecting on three landmark Supreme Court eminent domain cases, this paper will seek to demonstrate
how and why an abuse of power is taking place today. This paper will also examine the differences and implications of
the terms "use" and "purpose" and will argue for an amendment to the Constitution that would clarify the 5th
Amendment's eminent domain clause so that the abuse of this doctrine will stop immediately.
“Wherein excess power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected.”
James Madison 1792
Eighty-seven-year-old Wilhelmina Dery, an appellant in the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court eminent domain case of Kelo v.
City of New London, certainly did not think her property was respected when the home she lived in since 1918 and the
surrounding properties were appropriated by the government simply to create a higher tax base. Eminent domain is defined
as the power of the state to seize private property without the owner's consent. Protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, this doctrine states, “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Since the landmark U.S. Supreme Court Case of Berman v. Parker (1954) when the judicial branch interpreted, and
therefore redefined, the historic Doctrine of Eminent Domain to be broadly applicable for any “public purpose” rather than
the more narrow construction of “public use,” the government's abuse of power has led to a steady degradation of
individual property rights. An in-depth comparison between “use” and “purpose” will appear later in this paper. What may
appear to be a meaningless interpretation of the term “public purpose” is instead the crux of a “slippery slope” of abuse,
where one landmark decision has continued to adversely influence property rights for decades to come.
Through examining a brief history of the doctrine of eminent domain, along with the original intent of James Madison, a
key author of the Bill of Rights and the Federalist Papers, and looking closely at three landmark Supreme Court eminent
domain cases, this paper will demonstrate how, since the 1954 Berman case, the United States judicial branch of
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government is applying the Doctrine of Eminent Domain to unfairly appropriate private property for its own use without the
owner's consent. This paper will also argue for an amendment to the Constitution that will restrict the execution of eminent
domain to applications which would be consistent with the original intent of the legislative authors; such as the provision or
improvement of critical infrastructure, which includes: hospitals, highways, dams, state and national security, and
telecommunication facilities. In addition, property owners should receive just compensation not only in the fair market value
of their land, but in compensatory damages as well.
However, controversy revolving around eminent domain dates back much further than the landmark 1954 case. The
original ambiguity of the eminent domain clause stems from the question: What constitutes a public use? The clause
specifies nothing about what types of public use can justify the seizing of private property or what is meant by “just
compensation”. This ambiguity can only be resolved through an amendment to the Constitution which would specify the
guidelines for applying eminent domain and work to preserve the original intent of the doctrine. This paper will argue that
the original intent was to protect individual property rights, and implement a government annexation of property under the
doctrine of eminent domain only in limited circumstances when the property can be guaranteed to satisfy a greater public
good and the Public Use clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A Brief History of the Origin of Eminent Domain
The seizing of private property for government use in the United States dates back to colonial America. During the
American Revolution, the colonial government would appropriate private property to develop roads, accommodate the
military, and obtain numerous goods, often without compensating the owner whatsoever. It is ironic that our nation's
Revolution was being waged to break free from an overly oppressive government, to wit: the King of England; and yet,
oppressive actions were being taken by the same people who resisted. During this time period, just compensation was not
legally required as many believed it was the duty of the property owner to forsake his property for the greater good of the
community. It was also especially common for the government to seize the private property of individuals who were
suspected of aligning with the British. (Rackove, Dictionary of American History)
Still, many colonists did not believe that it was their obligation to give up their property, especially without
compensation. This frustration eventually led to the creation of the eminent domain clause of the Bill of Rights, written by
James Madison in 1791. This clause is now a part of what is we know as the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
According to author and historian Jack Rackove, Madison was a strong supporter of, “the protection of freedom of
conscience, rights of property, and basic civil liberties. He thought the real danger to rights came from state governments,
not national government.” (Rackove, Dictionary of American History)
Historically, the significance of the Bill of Rights is evident in the very fact that the thirteen original colonies had to ratify
these amendments that limited the government's power before the Constitution would be adopted. Rackove's analysis of
Madison is a clue early on in American history that although the ambiguity of the Bill of Rights is open to interpretation by
the judicial branch, its amendments were established to limit the power of the government; not to grant an extensive abuse
of power.
Madison's Original Intent in Authoring the Bill of Rights
Whenever considering whether or not an abuse of power is taking place concerning the application of any law, it is
crucial to consider the original intent of the legislative authors. Considering original intent is important because it encourages
consistency with respect to how a law or amendment is applied. If the judicial branch did not take the legislative authors'
intent in to consideration, interpretation of the Constitution would be malleable and subject to the personal opinion of
whomever sat on the bench at the time. Founded on a belief in state and individual rights, the United States Constitution
serves as a covenant to its people that it will consistently protect the rights of the individual, not the personal opinion of
government officials at any given time.
Transitioning from British rule, the thirteen original colonies sought to ratify a Constitution that would limit the power of
the government. Therefore, no matter how vague an amendment may appear, the mindset of early America must be
considered when interpreting the law. Evidence of this mindset is clear in early documents like the Federalist Papers as
well as other historical discourse. Consequently, clauses like the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment are clearly
in place to limit the power of the government to seize property unfairly and without just cause. According to a speech given
by Madison in 1792,
“As a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a
property in his rights. Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly
respected.”
Madison also recognized that an amendment would prove fruitless if it were too complicated, so he intentionally
constructed the Fifth Amendment to be relatively vague to benefit and protect the individual. He wrote in the Federalist No.
62,
“It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own
choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood; that no man who knows what the law is today can guess
what it will be tomorrow.”
This statement reinforces the advantage of deferring to original intent for matters of consistency, for if the judicial
branch did not take the legislative authors' original intent in to consideration, “no man who knows what the law is today can
guess what it will be tomorrow” (Madison). It has become a sad irony that the ambiguity of these laws is working against
the greater public, when in fact these laws were intentionally vague, not to leave room for the government to interpret for its
own advantage, but to accommodate the needs of the people in a developing society. These accommodations would
include the construction of critical infrastructures to sustain the basic needs of an American populace that is maturing and
requiring technological advances. For example, accommodations like the creation of highways and railroads for the
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transportation of both people and commerce, in addition to technology like the need for a 20th Century Kennedy Space
Center; advancements that clearly benefit the United States, its people and the world, but that were not likely predicted as
a need by our founding fathers.
However, beginning with the Supreme Court case of Berman v. Parker 1954, the U.S. judicial branch ruling
demonstrates how the government is widely interpreting the law to benefit only a few. The ruling permits transferring
property from one private agency to another private agency and declaring and subsequently abstractly rationalizing that the
creation of a greater tax base, while forcing property owners out of their homes simply because they are dubbed as
“slums,” constitutes as a “public purpose.” Through a review of the three landmark eminent domain Supreme Court cases,
all of which resulted in the loss of the private citizen's property, this paper will show how an abuse of power in relation to
the application of eminent domain has expanded over the decades.
Berman v. Parker 1954
Property rights were first ignored in the principal landmark eminent domain case of Berman v. Parker 1954. Among
growing government concern about blighted neighborhoods in the Washington D.C. area, the United States passed the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. The Act led to the creation of the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Agency whose members were given the task of collecting data about blighted areas in the community and then designing a
redevelopment plan that would rid the city of these sub-standard living conditions.
Through the Redevelopment Act, the Planning Commission was given the power to exercise eminent domain if
necessary. A survey of housing conditions run by the Commission in Southwest D.C. in 1950 revealed that, “64.3% of the
dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had
outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked
central heating” (Berman v. Parker, Douglas opinion). The Planning Commission chose to implement eminent domain over
the entire area, and not on a piece-meal or property by property basis, with the belief that the existence of theses “slums”
or substandard living conditions were a threat to public health.
The appellant, Berman, owned a department store in the area that was to be appropriated for eminent domain. The
appellant claimed that the taking of his property was unconstitutional because it was commercial and not residential
property, and although the store resided in an area that contained many blighted homes, the department store itself was
not classified as a “slum” or “blighted.” Additionally, the appellant claimed that if his property was seized, it was not going to
be redeveloped for a “public use” as guaranteed in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, but rather, redeveloped and
conveyed to the management of another private agency for their private, commercial use.
The power of the state to utilize eminent domain is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment and is applied to all of the states
through the 14th Amendment. Because the area in question in Berman v. Parker took place in Washington D.C., the
Supreme Court ruled that, “The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a
state may exercise over its affairs.” In other words, as Washington D.C. is not technically a state, Congress has what is
traditionally known as a police power over the area. Therefore, in the case of Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court
exercised great deference to Congress to establish what constituted a “public use” (Lersch, Northern's Exposure). The
deference shown by the Court is problematic because this allowed the legislative branch to interpret a law – a responsibility
that belongs to the Supreme Court, not Congress.
In the concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated that, “The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power
[eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” This is where the Justice Douglas
was wrong. Out of respect for Congress, the legislative body of the United States, as well as the governing body of the
District of Columbia, the opinion of the Court stated that a “public purpose” was satisfied in the taking of Berman's property
and was therefore constitutional because the redevelopment plan came from Congress. Douglas wrote in his opinion,
“When the legislature has spoken, public interest has been declared in terms well nigh conclusive.” However, the Court's
assumption that the legislature always has the public's best interest at heart is to strip the Supreme Court of their
credentials. It is the duty of the Court as the supreme Judicial Branch of the United States to interpret whether or not
Congress is legislating in a constitutional manner. Simply because Congress passes an Act such as the Redevelopment Act
of 1945, does not automatically guarantee that the act is either in the best interest of the public, or constitutional for that
matter. That interpretation is up to the Court, which Douglas and the Court seem to have failed to recognize in Douglas'
concurring opinion.
The United States Congress's decision to pass an act so extensive that it would seize a citizen's private property only to
convey it to another private agency under the guise of a greater “public purpose,” along with the Supreme Court's
subsequent failure to interpret this act as unconstitutional mark a turning point in the government's abuse of the eminent
domain doctrine. Before the Berman case went to the Supreme Court, in the 1953 Circuit Court Trial, known at that point
as Schneider v. District of Columbia, Circuit Judge E. Barrett Prettyman ruled that the taking of Berman's property would
be unconstitutional because it would not satisfy the “public use” requirement of the eminent domain clause. Barrett wrote in
his opinion, “The extensions of the concept of eminent domain, to encompass public purpose apart from public use, are
potentially dangerous to basic principles of our system of government.” The Court's decision that state legislatures may
exercise wide latitude in determining what serves as a “public purpose” in Berman v. Parker, only set the stage for further
abuse in cases like Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) and Kelo v. City of New London (2005).
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 1984
Thirty years after the Berman case, further misinterpretation of the proper application of eminent domain took place in
the Court decision of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984). The Hawaii State Legislature passed the Land Reform
Act of 1967 after discovering that nearly forty-seven percent of the state was owned by a mere seventy-two private land
owners (forty-nine percent of Hawaii was owned by the State). According to the state legislature, “to reduce the perceived
social and economic evils of a land oligopoly,” it would be necessary to apply the doctrine of eminent domain to seize
property from these land owners and then sell it to those citizens who were only able to rent property at this point, as very
little property was on the market. This plan not only endorsed a deviation in the ideals of a capitalist America by proposing
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a socialist solution of a redistribution of wealth, but it also inaccurately applied the doctrine of eminent domain and the
“public use” clause to do so. No “public use” standard or qualification is satisfied when property is being appropriated from
one private individual and conveyed to another private individual.
This is a good time to include a reminder about the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment; specifically, the Public Use
Clause. It states that, “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (Italics added) The Supreme Court was at fault in their
decision to endorse Hawaii's Land Reform Act on the basis that the application of eminent domain would satisfy a “public
purpose.” Nowhere in the Public Use clause is there a guarantee that property will be used for a public purpose; it is in fact,
the public use clause. “Use” is not only more specific than “purpose,” “use” is the term that is protected. In the concurring
opinion for HHA v. Midkiff, the Court seems to employ the terms “use” and “purpose” as synonyms, when in fact, they are
not. Purpose can be defined as a, “practical result, effect, or advantage” (dictionary.com) whereas use is defined as, “to
employ for some purpose; put into service; make use of”(dictionary.com).
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a citizen's property can only be appropriated through eminent domain if it
satisfies a public “use.” Justice O'Connor incorrectly defended the actions of the Hawaii Housing Authority on the basis of
fulfilling a public purpose or intent of the government. The deference shown by the Court to the Hawaiian Legislature was
strongly grounded in the Court's decision in Berman. Justice O'Connor writes in her opinion, “The Court has made clear that
it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.’”
Ultimately the Court ruled that there only needs to be a “rational relationship” between the taking of property and some
purpose that will benefit the public. Therefore, they essentially threw out the requirement that a government taking of
property must be for a public use stating, “The State's power to condemn property is as broad as its extensive police
power.”
It is unfortunate that, as in the Berman case, one needs to examine the ruling from the court directly preceding, or
below, the Supreme Court to get a clear understanding of the abuse that is taking place. According to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Land Reform Act was simply, “A naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii
to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit.”
Kelo v. City of New London 2005
The slippery slope of government abuse of power, and the incorrect conclusion that the term “public purpose” satisfies
the “public use” clause, was most recently displayed in the 2005 Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of New London. In
2000, the city government of New London, Connecticut reactivated the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a
private agency under control of the city government, to create plans to redevelop the area of New London and promote
economic growth. The reactivation of the NLDC was prompted by the construction of a new research facility for the
pharmaceutical company Pfizer on the outskirts of the town. The goal of the city was to promote economic activity that
could potentially be brought in by the Pfizer plant.
The NLDC determined that a large portion of the redevelopment would need to take place in the older neighborhood of
Fort Trumbell. The city gave the NLDC permission to exercise eminent domain to seize 115 properties in the Fort Trumbell
area, but fifteen land owners refused. These appellants, led by Suzette Kelo, refused to sell their property on the grounds
that the appropriation of their property would violate the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment; because their
land would immediately be turned over to private corporations to stimulate the local economy and promote a larger tax
base.
Referring to both the Berman case and the Midkiff case, the majority of the Supreme Court ruled that condemning
private property to promote economic development served as a logical “public purpose” for the city of New London.
According to Justice Stevens, who delivered the concurring opinion, “It [the Court] has embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as “public purpose.” It is imperative to note that in the Supreme Court review of the Kelo
case there were no allegations that any of the properties being condemned were blighted or in poor condition. Rather,
properties were only being seized because they happened to be in the area of a desired condominium development. A
narrowly divided Supreme Court ruled in a 5:4 decision that such economic development qualified as valid public use under
both the Federal and State Constitutions.
In her dissent to the Kelo majority ruling, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote, with some apparent disgust, “For who
among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the state from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”
Justice Thomas also disagreed adamantly with the majority decision and wrote in his dissenting opinion, “The most
natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public
has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever.” Thomas
went on to distinguish between the terms “use” and “purpose” and criticizes the majority's employment of the terms as
synonyms. Moreover, he critiqued the rulings made in Berman and Midkiff, and how those landmark decisions adversely
influenced the majority in Kelo.
Thomas, an adamant Originalist, wrote, “The weakness of those two lines of cases, and consequently Berman and
Midkiff, fatally undermines the doctrinal foundations of the Court's decision. Today's questionable application of these
cases is further proof that the ‘public purpose' standard is not susceptible of principled application. This Court's reliance by
rote on this standard is ill advised and should be reconsidered.” As an originalist, Thomas subscribed to the view that
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution should be consistent with the intent of those who drafted it. Thomas adds, “The public
use clause, in short, embodied the Framers' understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the
government from taking property from A. and giving it to B.”
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Relevance of Eminent Domain Abuse in 2008
Controversy revolving around eminent domain is as strong today as it was over 200 years ago – and for good reason.
What is crucial now is to stop this slippery slope of abuse before it goes any further. What started off as one man losing his
property under the misinterpretation of the Public Use clause in the Berman case, eventually led to fifteen property owners
losing their property simply to make room for private real-estate development; not a public use. Following the Kelo
decision, a public outcry led dozens of state legislatures to draft bills that would further limit the ability of the government to
appropriate private property. However, on a federal level, since it is abundantly clear from the cases of Berman, Midkiff,
and Kelo that the Supreme Court will defer to the Congress to define “public use,” a constitutional remedy needs to take
place in the form of an amendment to the Constitution. It would be essential that an amendment to the Public Use Clause
would specify the guidelines and standards of a “public use” to preserve the original intent of the legislative authors, and
prevent this slippery slope of property rights abuse from continuing.
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